

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 08/13/2003

To: Counterterrorism
Inspection
Laboratory

Washington Field

Attn: SSA [redacted] WMDOU
Attn: IIC [redacted]
Attn: SSA [redacted] HMRU
SSA [redacted] HMRU
Attn: SA [redacted] AMX-2

b6
b7C

From: Washington Field
AMX-1

Contact: SA [redacted]

b6
b7C

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936 (Pending) - 5517

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To request assistance from HMRU in transporting agar slant from Building [redacted] to Building [redacted] at USAMRIID.

b7F

Administrative: Reference telcals between writer and SSA [redacted] on 08/12/2003, and telcals between SA [redacted] and SSA [redacted] on 08/13/2003, respectively.

b6
b7C

Details: Investigation conducted by the AMERITHRAX squad has determined that an agar slant containing Ames strain *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) needs to be placed in the FBI Ba repository, a collection of Ames strain Ba obtained from various sources around the nation, located in Building [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. The slant is currently in the possession of Dr. Bruce Ivins, Suite B3, Building 1425, USAMRIID. It is important to note that both the Ba repository and Dr. Ivins laboratory are both designated as Biological Safety Level (BSL) 3 space.


b7F

Washington Field requests that HMRU do the following:

1). Allow SA [redacted] AMX-2, to retrieve referenced item from Dr. Ivins laboratory and place it in the FBI Ba repository.

b6
b7C

b7E



b6
b7C



To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 08/13/2003

2). Provide the appropriate FBI oversight necessary to accomplish referenced task.

To: Counterterrorism From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 08/13/2003

LEAD(s):

Set Lead 1: (Info)

COUNTERTERRORISM

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Read and clear.

Set Lead 2: (Info)

INSPECTION

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Read and clear.

Set Lead 3: (Action)

LABORATORY

AT QUANTICO, VA

Washington Field requests that HMRU do the following:

b6
b7C

1). Allow SA AMX-2, to retrieve referenced item from Dr. Ivins laboratory and place it in the FBI Ba repository.

2). Provide the appropriate FBI oversight necessary to accomplish referenced task.

Set Lead 4: (Action)

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, DC

Coordinate referenced activities with appropriate personnel at HMRU and USAMRIID.

♦♦

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/09/2003

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field

AMX-2

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936 (Pending) - 5595
279-WF-C217225 (Pending) - 64Title: AMERITHRAX
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To record statistical accomplishments of HMRT.


Details: On August 15, 2003, SA [REDACTED] Amerithrax-2, Washington Field Office (WFO), met with Bruce E. Ivins, Ph.D. at his place of employment, the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland to deposit the original *Bacillus anthracis* Ames agar slant labeled, "AMES 255414B B. anthracis" and its corresponding cardboard shipping container postmarked February 18, 1981, to [REDACTED], Dept. of the Army - U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland 21701" and originating from [REDACTED] into the FBI Ames Repository (FBIR) housed in building [REDACTED] room [REDACTED] of USAMRIID.

b6
b7C
b7E

SA [REDACTED] placed each item into individual ziploc-type bags, sealed them, and wiped their exteriors with a bleach solution before placing each of them into a second ziploc-type bag. The outer ziploc-type bags were wiped with a bleach solution and placed together inside another ziploc-type bag. The outer ziploc-type bag was wiped with a bleach solution and placed in a turned-out biohazard bag inside a transport container on the cold side of the B3 airlock. From the hot-side of suite B3, SA [REDACTED] observed, through the window of the airlock, as [REDACTED] employee at USAMRIID, accompanied by [REDACTED] Hazardous Materials Response Unit, Hazardous Materials Officer [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] opened the airlock from the cold side, closed the biohazard bag into the transport


b6
b7C

[REDACTED]



b6
b7C
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg
back of page



b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 09/09/2003

container, sprayed a bleach solution around the rim of the container, sealed the container, wiped off its exterior with a bleach solution, and passed the container to [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

At this point SA [REDACTED] showered out of suite B3 and escorted [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to building [REDACTED] where the FBIR is located. SA [REDACTED] took the transport container and secured it in the FBIR refrigerator in room [REDACTED] of building [REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7F

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 09/09/2003

Accomplishment Information:

Number: 1

Type: PARTICIPATE AS MEMBER OF AN WMD WORKING GROUP/TASK FORCE

ITU: WMD OPERATIONS

Claimed By:

SSN:

Name:

Squad:

b6
b7C

♦♦

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/23/2003

On June 17, 2003, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted] home
address [redacted] telephone [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] attorney's office, [redacted]
[redacted] telephone [redacted]
[redacted] by Special Agents (SAs) [redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] Washington Field Office, and SA [redacted] New
York Office. Also present for the interview were [redacted]
[redacted] attorney, and [redacted] of [redacted] After
being advised of the identities of the interviewing Agents and the
purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

b6
b7C

[redacted] accepted the position of [redacted] at the
UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS
DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, MD, in approximately [redacted]
[redacted] prior employment at [redacted]
[redacted] involved [redacted] arrived at [redacted]
USAMRIID shortly after [redacted]

13/45

[redacted] was experienced with [redacted] thus
[redacted] was tasked with identifying [redacted]

work included [redacted]

b7E

Investigation on 06/17/2003 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936 [redacted]

Date dictated [redacted]

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]b6
b7C

279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101392

b6
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/17/2003 , Page 2

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Aerosol challenges using *B.a.* Ames spores were conducted against test animals, including guinea pigs and rhesus macaques. The effectiveness of USAMRIID'S trial vaccines was compared to that of the Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA), the licensed human anthrax vaccine.

The development of an anthrax vaccine necessitated collaboration among numerous USAMRIID scientists, including [REDACTED] BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did not grow the virulent *B.a.* Ames spores used in the studies, nor did [REDACTED] participate in the aerosolization of the spores. The *B.a.* Ames spores were generated by IVINS, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Last Name Unknown (LNU: [REDACTED] known to interviewing Agents as [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]
IVINS [REDACTED] would prepare spores using liquid media in shake flasks. A special centrifuge with a vacuum was used in the production process. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] a minimal media supplemented with bicarbonate, was developed by IVINS. [REDACTED] recalled using blood agar on occasion and involvement in a study which employed *Bacillus subtilis*.

[REDACTED] never produced *B.a.* Ames spores. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not receive or send Select Agents during [REDACTED] tenure at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] IVINS, [REDACTED] shipped [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101392

b6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/17/2003, Page 3

materials from USAMRIID, with authorization from [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] sent to [REDACTED] an avirulent strain of B/a which secreted only the lethal factor (LF) when fermented. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was not aware of the maintenance of inventories during [REDACTED] tenure at USAMRIID. Exchanges of materials among USAMRIID scientists were not documented. [REDACTED] was never given a hot strain of bacteria while at USAMRIID.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] primary work areas in Building [REDACTED] included [REDACTED] Suite [REDACTED] and Suite [REDACTED] Suites [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were communal areas for the [REDACTED] Division. [REDACTED] group conducted their studies mainly in Suite [REDACTED] Suite [REDACTED] was also used by [REDACTED] IVINS and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] used Suites [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on occasion. [REDACTED] worked primarily in Building [REDACTED] accessed only the [REDACTED] area on the [REDACTED] floor of Building [REDACTED] did not work in the [REDACTED] suites of Building [REDACTED] described the changing of laboratory space at USAMRIID as "musical chairs". Due to space limitations, there were always contests for laboratory areas. Money was tight at USAMRIID at times, thus people did a lot of "mooching".

[REDACTED] group stored only [REDACTED] These materials were located in the refrigerators and freezers in Suites [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] maintained samples on a shelf in a -70C, unlocked freezer [REDACTED] IVINS [REDACTED] recalled that there was a [REDACTED] in one of the suites. [REDACTED] did not recall storing items in [REDACTED] a storage area at [REDACTED] by the [REDACTED] Division.

[REDACTED] at USAMRIID, Suites B3 and B4 were "down" and considered cold areas. A lyophilizer was located in the vicinity of these suites. It was a shelf dryer that never worked well. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS went to a lyophilizer course and lyophilized PA; however, studies were never conducted on the powdered materials to determine the effects of drying on PA stability. Lyophilizers were not used that often at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] indicated that USAMRIID maintained 8 to 10 Speed-Vacs.

[REDACTED] works currently for [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101392

b6
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 06/17/2003 , Page 4

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] assisted with [REDACTED]
At [REDACTED] request, USAMRIID sent [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] from USAMRIID provided assistance. The materials were accompanied
by an Authorization of Sterility document and were sent through [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] at USAMRIID. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not use a lyophilizer while at USAMRIID, but
[REDACTED] lyophilizer was used for the
production of [REDACTED] knew of two main brands of
lyophilizers, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was [REDACTED] at USAMRIID.
[REDACTED] treated people horribly,
including IVINS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] did not work, or socialize, with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] did not talk with [REDACTED] nor did [REDACTED]
with [REDACTED] recognized [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] saw [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] did not recall [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] office in USAMRIID'S Building [REDACTED] was not located near
[REDACTED] office. [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] office was near those of
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] were the only [REDACTED] Division personnel with whom [REDACTED]
recalled working.

b6
b7c

[REDACTED] never provided [REDACTED] to the
[REDACTED] and did not participate in [REDACTED]

b6
b7c

279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101392

b6
b7c

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 06/17/2003

, Page 5

socialized with few individuals from USAMRIID.

believed the theory that the materials in the anthrax mailings were produced in a kitchen was far-fetched. Individual scientists at USAMRIID possessed bits and pieces of the abilities needed to carry out the attacks. was the only individual who had access to

TVINS did not possess the necessary security clearance. believed that the work was done in a professional laboratory by an individual who spent time in a laboratory and knew how to do this type of thing. However, a scientist at USAMRIID would not be able to conduct work "free-lance" without people noticing only knowledge of the evidentiary materials was that published by the news media.

was aware that THE INSTITUTE FOR GENOMIC RESEARCH (TIGR) was developing PCR assays to screen many B.a. samples.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/12/2003b6
b7C

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social security number [redacted] telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of residence. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] worked for the United States Army at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland from [redacted] through [redacted]. While at USAMRIID, [redacted] worked in the [redacted] Department as a [redacted] located at various sites within [redacted]. The layout of [redacted] have been placed inside a FD-340 with [redacted] work area indicated by multiple "X". In addition, [redacted]

[redacted] only knew of [redacted] on a face to face basis. [redacted] rarely carried along any conversations with [redacted] who [redacted] described as a "bragger". [redacted]

[redacted] never saw [redacted] take anything out of the lab or buildings. In addition, [redacted] didn't know whether [redacted] knew [redacted] or [redacted].

[redacted] did not work with BACILLUS ANTHRACIS (BA), but indicated that BA was kept in a special chamber located in the bio-safety level 3 suite. Electronic identification and a pin number were required for entrance. In addition, [redacted] never used the Hot Suite area located in building [redacted].

[redacted] had no knowledge of anyone that displayed anti-government feelings or showed any interest in using anthrax or any other select agents as weapons. In addition, [redacted] knew of no one that expressed an interest in being able to get around forensic techniques. [redacted] never saw or noticed people "piggy-backing" into or out of buildings. [redacted] never worked with anyone that displayed a lax attitude when handling or working with chemicals or agents. [redacted]

b6
b7C

b7E

Investigation on 09/11/2003 at [redacted]File # 279A-WF-222936 5032 279A-BA-C101392-1226 Date dictated 09/12/2003

by SA [redacted]

b6
b7C

279A-WF-222936 / 279A-BA-C101392

b6
b7C

Continuation of FD-302 of

[REDACTED]

, On 09/11/2003 , Page 2

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of anyone that [REDACTED] believes is associated with the mailings of the antrax letters but indicated that [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] described as being a disgruntled worker [REDACTED] all locks in building [REDACTED] have been changed.

[REDACTED] had no personal contact with anyone in Trenton, New Jersey or any other areas of New Jersey.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] never used any of the vending machines in Frederick to purchase pre-stamped envelopes.

[REDACTED] indicated BRUCE IVINS as the person in USAMRIID that processed the sent antrax letters.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 05/21/2004

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field

Attn: IIC
SSA
SSA
SA

From: Washington Field
AMX-3

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936 (Pending) -6263

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To summarize the AMX-3 project which involved tracking Dugway Ames received by USAMRIID prior to the anthrax-laced letter mailings.

Enclosures: Microsoft Excel spreadsheets summarizing pertinent dates from Notebook [REDACTED] regarding Reference Material (RMR) 1029 (containing Dugway Ames) and a log detailing dates that *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) was irradiated.

b6
b7C

Details: In 1997, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, was in need of a large amount of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) Ames strain spores. These spores were to be used primarily for aerosol challenges. Since USAMRIID did not have the capability to produce the large number of spores needed (30 trillion) in an expedient manner, USAMRIID contracted this work out to Dugway Proving Grounds, Dugway, Utah (Dugway).

A laboratory notebook assigned to [REDACTED] Number [REDACTED] was retrieved from the USAMRIID library archives. This notebook contained numerous entries by Bruce Ivins regarding Ba Ames and correspondence between Dugway and USAMRIID, including contract agreements for work to be performed and Ames production methods. One entry displayed a letter sent from [REDACTED] to Dugway, and detailed the terms of the agreement that involved USAMRIID shipping 4 vials of Ba Ames spores to Dugway. Using these vials, Dugway would grow a total of approximately 10 batches, or 30 trillion spores, which would then be sent as approximately 10 individual shipments to USAMRIID.

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

1-35-9

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 05/21/2004

b6
b7C
b7F

Pursuant to this contract, Dugway also sent Ba Ames in a paste form, which was received by both Ivins and [redacted] and documented by Ivins in a lab notebook. This notebook was entitled "USAMRIID Notebook 4010". Seven batches of wet slurry were shipped to Ivins from Dugway between April 23, 1997 and October 24, 1997. The seventh batch, shipped October 24, 1997, was deemed by Ivins to be so "dirty" that the spores were autoclaved. Ivins combined purified batches of the first six shipments into final lots with other Ames spores from Ivins' collection, which were then all combined into a final lot on October 22, 1997. This lot was called RMR 1029. RMR 1029 was dispersed into two equal lots, 500 milliliters per lot, and stored at 2-8 degrees Celsius in polycarbonate screw-capped flasks in the B3 cold room in Building 1425. Ivins described the spores as "...highly purified. They are >95% unclumped, single, refractile spores." Ivins advised that one milliliter or less of the Dugway material could be taken and wouldn't be missed. Details on Ivins' processing of the Dugway batches of spores, and their combination to form RMR 1029, are documented in a separate

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 05/21/2004

EC. After performing some calculations, Ivins estimated that, to achieve the spore concentration found in the anthrax letter mailings, approximately 300 milliliters of the Dugway RMR 1029 material would have been required. This amount of missing material would have been noticed. In a December 12, 2003 interview, Ivins indicated that he had approximately 100 milliliters left of this sample; however, it is unclear whether Ivins is basing this statement on his records or on the actual sample. Given the subtraction error (see page 4) made by Ivins. on February 22, 2000, it is possible that Ivins may actually have 200 milliliters left of the Dugway RMR 1029 sample. Ivins did not notice this subtraction error until it was pointed out to him during an FBI interview. The Ames produced under this agreement was further processed at USAMRIID by Ivins as described in a separate EC. It was then used in live form by Ivins and other USAMRIID researchers in anthrax vaccine challenges.

Also contained within Notebook [] was a Dugway draft standard operating procedure (SOP), entitled []. This document outlined the cultures and the processing methods to be used for preparation of Ba spores in less than 10-liter quantities. Such preparations were typically utilized as challenge material in testing bio-defense material. The preparations could also be employed for other applications. For example, the spores could serve as antigens for the production of antiserum or could be used as a coating antigen in antibody capture enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs). This draft SOP is presumably, but not conclusively, the method Dugway used to grow Ba Ames for USAMRIID; [] sent [] an e-mail on February 12, 1998 requesting that [] send [] a letter stating that the draft SOP was the final procedure used to make the USAMRIID spore preparations. However, no such letter from [] was found in the notebook.

b6
b7C

One of the steps in the above SOP under "Materials and Methods" required the addition of []

b7F

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
 Re: 279A-WF-222936, 05/21/2004

Following is a reproduction of Ivins' Reference
 Material Receipt Record, initiated on October 22, 1997:

<i>Amount In</i>	<i>Amount Used</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Balance Left</i>	<i>Initials</i>
1000 ml	1 ml	9/17/98	999 ml	BI
	1 ml	3/16/99	998 ml	BI
	1 ml	3/23/99	997 ml	BI
	2 ml	5/5/99	995 ml	BI
	1 ml	5/11/99	994 ml	BI
**	6 ml (Covance)	2/22/00	888 ml	BI
	8 ml (Covance)	3/22/00	880 ml	BI
	75 ml (BOO- 03, Part 1)	4/3/00	805 ml	BI
	1 ml	6/29/00	804 ml	BI
	40 ml (BOO- 03, Part 2)	7/7/00	764 ml	BI
	40 ml [redacted]	8/28/00	724 ml	BI
	100 ml [redacted] challenge)	12/4/00	624 ml	BI
	60 ml (BOO- 03, Part 3)	4/6/01	564 ml	BI
	90 ml [redacted] [redacted] Battelle)	5/1/01	474 ml	BI
	50 ml [redacted] [redacted] Battelle)	6/15/01	424 ml	BI
	50 ml (BOO- 03, Part 4)	7/9/01	374 ml	BI

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
 Re: 279A-WF-222936, 05/21/2004

	5 ml		8/27/01	369 ml	BI
	10 ml		10/4/01	359 ml	BI

b6
b7C

** Denotes incorrect subtraction, thus suggesting that 100 milliliters of Ba may be unaccounted for.

The following table condenses the previous table, with explanation to ensue:

Name	ml received	Total ml	Transferred to
Unaccounted for	1+1+1+2+1+1	7	N/A
Covance	8+6	14	
BOO-03	75+40+60+50	225	N/A
	40	40	
Bioport	100	100	
	90+50+20	160	
(Battelle)			
	5	5	No
	10	10	No

b6
b7C

To elaborate on Ivins' table of RMR 1029 dissemination:

Ivins was telephonically interviewed by Special Agent (SA) [redacted] on April 13, 2004, and indicated that "BOO-03" (Parts 1-8) referred to samples used for aerosol challenges for [redacted] was previously interviewed, and indicated that [redacted] has not visited the hot suites since [redacted]

b6
b7C

Ivins assisted with [redacted] research projects, predominantly with vaccine challenges. This information was corroborated by [redacted] who advised that if any aerosol challenge logs indicated that [redacted] it was Ivins who was handling the aerosol challenge for [redacted] did not know whether bacterial stocks or spores remained from [redacted] studies, [redacted]

[redacted] did not recall ever requesting that [redacted] samples be inventoried or destroyed. [redacted] did not recall ever sending Ames outside of USAMRIID, either domestically or internationally.

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 05/21/2004

Bruce Ivins indicated that [redacted] worked for [redacted] and obtained some Dugway Ba from Ivins for aerosol challenges. Ivins also elaborated on the 7th shipment of Dugway Ba, indicating that it was so dirty it was autoclaved without being used. Ivins advised that the Dugway material to be autoclaved was left inside B3 and was usually autoclaved soon after being put in the autoclave bag. Ivins could not remember the disposal timeline of this particular shipment and did not personally see it destroyed.

b6
b7C

[redacted] (listed as [redacted] in Ivins' April 13, 2004 interview), worked at USAMRIID. [redacted] relinquished possession of [redacted] Ba spores to [redacted] took charge of a 5-milliliter wet pellet of Ames and autoclaved it in Room [redacted] of Building [redacted]. [redacted] advised that there is written documentation regarding the transfer of the Ba to [redacted] [redacted] claimed [redacted] never transferred any Ba to any other researcher, nor did [redacted] take any Ba out of Building [redacted]. In a May 9, 2003 interview with [redacted] indicated that Ivins provided [redacted] with a tube of liquid Ba Ames spores. These spores were stored in the first floor walk-in cooler in the containment facility of Building [redacted]. [redacted] did not recall the maintenance of a log or inventory for the walk-in cooler. [redacted] corroborated that [redacted] was designated as the caretaker of the remaining Ba Ames spores when [redacted] left USAMRIID.

b6
b7C
b7F

[redacted] indicated in a September 11, 2003 interview that [redacted] did not maintain any stock cultures of any strain of Ba, to include the Ames strain. [redacted] always obtained Ba spores from Ivins, as no one in [redacted] laboratory group grew spores. At any given time, there was a limited number of Ba spores kept in the refrigerators in [redacted] laboratory space. [redacted] claimed [redacted] did not distribute, nor did [redacted] share, any of Ivins' Ba Ames spores beyond [redacted]. [redacted] claimed [redacted] never sent Ba outside of USAMRIID. In [redacted] May 11, 2004 telephonic interview, [redacted] indicated that [redacted] has never directly received any samples of Ba from Dugway. [redacted] did acknowledge receiving a sample from Ivins; that sample was "probably" transferred to [redacted] in a 1-milliliter tube, maintained inside a 15-milliliter conical centrifuge tube. [redacted] stored this sample in the [redacted] walk-in refrigerator and used the Ba in experiments over a period of several months. [redacted] did not keep a written record of this sample and so could not provide any exact documentation.

[redacted] indicated in a May 10, 2004 telephonic interview that [redacted] had received samples of Dugway Ba from Ivins in order to conduct aerosol challenge studies. [redacted] saved small aliquots of approximately one milliliter of the original Ba spore

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 05/21/2004

b6
b7C

preparations after each challenge. These aliquots were kept in [redacted] laboratory refrigerator in Building [redacted] Room [redacted]. However, prior to the anthrax-laced letter mailings, [redacted] did not keep a record of these samples and so could not provide any documentation regarding their exact amount or location.

Other individuals, not listed on Ivins' Reference Material Receipt Record, also appeared to have had access to Dugway Ba. During an interview of [redacted] indicated that "[redacted] has also examined samples of B. anthracis from Dugway Proving Ground and UNSCOM inspections." [redacted] was then interviewed telephonically on May 10, 2004, and did not deny the possibility that [redacted] had examined samples. However, [redacted] had no recollection of having analyzed any specific samples from Dugway. [redacted] would have to go back to [redacted] lab notebooks to check, but would need additional information such as more details about the samples or a more specific context in which to look. [redacted] has received too many simulant samples to remember the origin of each sample. Moreover, [redacted] is not always provided with the origin of the Ba samples [redacted] receives. However, because [redacted] works in the [redacted] section at USAMRIID [redacted] the only samples [redacted] receives of Ba are [redacted]

[redacted] indicated in a December 14, 2001 interview that [redacted] had done some assay work with killed Ames spores from Dugway. However, in a May 18, 2004 interview, [redacted] clarified that this work was done after September 11, 2001; [redacted] included the killed spores as control samples in a test kit used for post-September 11 (but pre-anthrax laced letter mailings) testing done as a precaution at different sites such as the Pentagon. [redacted] received these killed spores from [redacted], but had no knowledge as to where these spores came from, or whether they were killed before or after their entry into USAMRIID.

[redacted] was listed after October 2001 on Ivins' Reference Material Receipt Record as having received one milliliter of Ba on November 14, 2001. When interviewed, [redacted] corroborated that [redacted] has used some of the Dugway Ames spores which [redacted] obtained from Ivins. It is unclear whether [redacted] received any Dugway Ames before this time. [redacted] advised [redacted] does not usually share spore preparations with others. [redacted]

However, [redacted] has not mailed Ba outside USAMRIID for

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 05/21/2004

b6
b7C

years, and would notice if there were any vials missing from [redacted] Ames stock.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] never received any Ames directly from Dugway. [redacted] only received a little suspension of what Ivins had obtained from Dugway, and this occurred during 2002. [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] stated in a February 11, 2003 interview that [redacted] obtained Ba from Dugway for [redacted] research [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] Dugway could produce Ba in large batches. In the same interview, [redacted] stated that the Dugway samples were maintained by [redacted], and that [redacted] only used the Dugway material for [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] This statement by [redacted] may have been referring to Dugway material sent after the mailings; [redacted] maintained in a May 13, 2003 interview that, prior to the anthrax mailings, the only Dugway Ba at USAMRIID was that maintained and used by Ivins.

Because Dugway did not have a functional irradiation facility, Dugway also sent Ames to USAMRIID for irradiation. Once the samples of Ba Ames were received from Dugway, various individuals had access. [redacted]

[redacted] at USAMRIID, irradiated Ba for Bruce Ivins [redacted]
[redacted] In particular, [redacted] remembered irradiating [redacted] milliliter solution of Ba from Dugway. In a September 16, 2003 interview with [redacted] related that approximately three to four times, Dugway sent Ba spores to USAMRIID for irradiation. Ivins' lab group was "roped" into the process since they were part of the Bacteriology Division and worked with Ba. After the spores had been irradiated, Ivins' lab group would retrieve them from the cold room in the warehouse near the loading dock. To gain access to the warehouse, the individuals in the lab group had to go down the hallway near [redacted] recalled that the spores may have been in centrifuge bottles that were packaged inside shipping containers. Ivins' group would take the spores to Suite B3 and attempt to grow them on plates as a sterility check. [redacted] advised that [redacted] would not have taken the Dugway spores to be irradiated, nor would [redacted] have picked them up for the sterility check after irradiation. Ivins may have records pertaining to the Dugway spore irradiation sterility checks. If the results for growth were negative, he may not have made a record of it. [redacted] recalled one instance when the spores had not all been killed by irradiation, and thought that Ivins may have recorded

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: 279A-WF-222936, 05/21/2004

that data. This incident happened when [redacted] was employed at USAMRIID.

b6
b7C

In addition to the wet slurry form of Ba Ames, Dugway sent dry Ba to USAMRIID to be irradiated and then returned to Dugway. This apparently only occurred after the mailings. According to an interview with [redacted] on January 23, 2002, this Ba was secured in a refrigerator/freezer, irradiated, and shipped back out. According to [redacted] the only individuals who had access to the refrigerator/freezer where those spores were stored. Although [redacted] received shipments of infectious material from Dugway, [redacted] did not recall handling dry Ba.


If additional information is obtained during the investigation regarding Dugway Ames within USAMRIID, an additional EC will be prepared.

♦♦

Notebook #4010	
p. 2 1st batch, 2 lots	
p. 2 Shipped from Dugway w/ tamper-indicating seal	4/23/1997
p.6 Lots #: 4/12/97 and 4/14/97	
p.6 Received by Ivins	4/24/1997
p.9 After prep work:	
115 ml	5/1/1997
p. 10 Leighton-Doi Ames spores combined with Dugway to make "material spores"	6/5/1997
p.10 L-D batch dates: 1/17, 1/24, 1/27, 2/3, 2/24, 3/3, 3/10, 3/17, 3/24	
p. 11 2nd batch, 3 lots	
p.15 Shipped from Dugway w/ tamper-indicating seal	6/24/1997
p.11 Lot #: 4/22/97, 4/25/97, 5/19/97	
p.11 Received by Ivins	6/25/1997
p.14 After prep work:	
250 ml	7/18/1997
p.22 3rd batch, 2 lots	
p.22 Lot #: 5/22/97, 6/28/97	
p.26 Shipped from Dugway w/ tamper-indicating seal	7/9/1997
p.22 Received by [REDACTED]	7/10/1997
p.25 After prep work (by Ivins):	
170 ml	7/29/1997
p.34 Spores from Leighton-Doi purified and stored in a polycarbonate flask at 2-8 deg. C	8/29/1997
p.34 Batch dates: 4/14, 4/21, 4/28, 5/13, 5/23, 6/2, 6/13, 6/30, 7/28	
p.34 Plated on TSA and then counted	9/12/1997
p.35 4th batch, 2 lots	
p.37 Shipped from Dugway w/ tamper-indicating seal	7/23/1997
p.40 Lot #: 7/11/97, 7/17/97	
p.40 Received at USAMRIID	7/24/1997
p.43 After prep work:	
240 ml	9/14/1997
p.44 5th batch, 2 lots	
p.44 Shipped from Dugway w/ tamper-indicating seal	8/6/1997
p.48 Lot #: 7/21/97, 8/2/97	
p.48 Received at USAMRIID	8/7/1997
p.51 After prep work:	
140 ml	9/4/1997
p.52 Ames spores from "our batches" purified	9/19/1997
Batch dates: 8/11, 8/12, 8/25, 9/8	
Stored in polycarbonate flask at 2-8 deg. C	
Combined with Dugway and previously purified spores (pgs. 10, 34)	
p.53 6th batch, 1 lot	
p.54 Shipped from Dugway w/ tamper-indicating seal	9/3/1997
p.58 Lot #: 8/4/97	
p. 53 6th batch, 1 lot (continued)	

p.58 Received at USAMRIID	9/4/1997
p.61 After prep work:	
100 ml	9/18/1997
p.69 7th batch, 2 lots	
p.69 So "dirty" that they were autoclaved [were they actually?]	10/24/1997
p.62 Ivins combined purified batches of Ames spores into final lots, which were then combined into a final RMR 1029 lot:	
Lot One:	
a. 5th Dugway spore lot	
b. 6th Dugway spore lot	
c. "Our" purified spores (p. 10)	
d. "Our" purified spores (p. 34)	
e. "Our" purified spores (p. 52)	
Total volume: 320 ml	
Put into a 500 ml polycarbonate flask and stored at 2-8 deg. C	10/7/1997
Lot Two:	
a. 1st Dugway spore lot	
b. 2nd Dugway spore lot	
c. 3rd Dugway spore lot	
d. 4th Dugway spore lot	
Total volume: 150 ml	
Put into a 250 ml polycarbonate flask and stored at 2-8 deg. C	10/8/1997
Lot Three:	
Combined spores from Dugway shipments 1-6 and "our" Ames spores	
Total volume: 100 ml	10/9/1997
Put into 250 ml polycarbonate flask and stored at 2-8 deg. C	
Lot Four:	
Combined spores from all Dugway shipments and "our" Ames spores	
Total volume: 120 ml	10/10/1997
p. 68 The four lots of purified Ames spores were combined into a single batch and qs'd to 1000 ml. The spores were then dispersed into 2 equal lots, 500 ml/lot in polycarbonate screw-capped flasks. Stored in the B-3 cold room.	10/22/1997
Ivins sent 1029 irradiated spores to [redacted] at FCRF Quality Control Lab, Bldg. [redacted]	3/20/1998
Telephone: [redacted]	
Actually analyzed by [redacted] and reviewed by [redacted] on 3/20/98	
Also analyzed and reviewed by 2 others on 3/26; indecipherable signatures	

b6
b7C



ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

FACSIMILE
TRANSMITTAL
HEADER SHEET

AGENT COPY



LIFE SCIENCES DIVISION, WEST DESERT TEST
CENTER
U.S. ARMY DUGWAY PROVING GROUND

b6
b7C

FAX Number:
Voice Number:

Commercial
Commercial

CLASSIFICATION: UUN

DATE: 8 MAY 03

Total Pages (including cover): 5

FROM:

TO:

SUBJECT: _____

Remarks/Special Instructions:

If transmission is incomplete or faulty, notify sender immediately

P. 01

FAX NO

MAY-08-2003 THU 10:42 AM CO

Order ID	Order Date	Customer ID Name	Requested Materials	Date Shipped Order Complete	Items Shipped (Shipped by)
214		USAMRIID [redacted] [redacted] USAMRIID Frederick MD 2170 U.S.A.		29-Feb-00 ✓	1 vial CRP 03, JPO-002, 1mg/ml, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 04, JPO-011, 1 mg/ml, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 06, JPO-012, 1:10, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 07, JPO-019, 1 mg/ml, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 08, JPO-004, 1 mg/ml, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 09, JPO-005, 1 mg/ml, 8 ml 1 vial CRP 10, JPO-010, 1%, 1ml 1 vial CRP 11, JPO-014, 1 mg/ml, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 12, JPO-025, 1 mg/ml, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 13, JPO-017, undilute, 0 ml 1 vial CRP 14, JPO-006, 1 mg/ml, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 15, JPO-015, 1:10, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 16, JPO-018, 1 mg/ml, 3.5 ml 1 vial CRP 17, JPO-007, 1%, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 18, JPO-003, 1 mg/ml, 5 ml 0 vials CRP 19, JPO-020, undilute, 0 ml 1 vial CRP 21, JPO-023, 1 mg/ml, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 22, JPO-013, 1 mg/ml, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 23, JPO-009, 1 mg/ml, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 24, JPO-021, 1 mg/ml, 8 ml 1 vial CRP 25, JPO-024, 1 mg/ml, 10 ml 0 vials CRP 26, JPO-022, 0.5 mg/ml, 0 ml 1 vial CRP 27, JPO-026, 1 mg/ml, 5 ml 1 vial CRP 28, JPO-010, undilut, 10 ml with certificate of non-viability.
220		USAMRIID [redacted] [redacted] USA Frederick MD 2170 U.S.A.	Samples sent for gamma irradiation.	11-Apr-00 ✓	23 ml of [redacted] (9 mile strain), Phase I, 6.0 x 10 ¹¹ ID50s/ml, protein concentration 17.6 mg/ml, Lot # 14 Jan98 with EA 101.
262		USAMRIID [redacted] [redacted] USA Frederick MD 2170 U.S.A.	Sent for irradiation DSN 343-4768	30-Aug-00 ✓	175 ml Bacillus anthracis, Ames strain, 9.67x10 ⁸ CFU/ml 175 ml of Bacillus anthracis [redacted] strain, 5.33x10 ⁸ CFU/ml

b6
b7c

Order ID	Order Date	Customer ID Name	Requested Materials	Date Shipped Order Complete	Items Shipped (Shipped by)
399		USAMRIID [redacted] [redacted] USAMRIID Frederick MD 2170 U.S.A. <i>Conducted via [redacted]</i>	DSN 343-4768 Live Bacillus anthracis sent for irradiation	27-Jun-01 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Bacillus anthracis (live): sterne strain, 120 ml, 27 Jul 00 sterne strain, 120 ml, 15 Nov 00 sterne strain, 120 ml, 18 Nov 00 Ames, 180 ml Ames, 160 ml EA-101 <i>[Handwritten mark]</i>
400		USAMRIID [redacted] [redacted] USAMRIID Frederick MD 2170 U.S.A.		10-Jul-01 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	10 ml of freeze-dried live Vaccinia virus (Lister strain), [redacted]
416		USAMRIID [redacted] [redacted] MD 2170 U.S.A.	DSN 343-4768	31-Jul-01 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	4 bottles of liquid BG, 1 liter total. For irradiation [redacted]
400		USAMRIID [redacted] [redacted] USAMRIID Frederick MD 2170 U.S.A.	Yersinia pestis (Live) sent for irradiation	14-Aug-01 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Live Yersinia pestis, 90 ml, 5.6x10e9 [redacted]
421		USAMRIID [redacted] [redacted] USAMRIID Frederick MD 2170 U.S.A. <i>Conducted?</i>		25-Sep-01 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	1 vial C. burnetii, apr killed, DPG14Jun99, 1.9x10e9, 1 mg/ml, 5 mls 2 vials B. anthracis, Ames, killed, DPG23Dec99, 1.3x10e10, 1 mg/ml, 10 ml. Certificates of non-viability and EA-101s [redacted]

Order ID	Order Date	Customer ID Name	Requested Materials	Date Shipped Order Complete	Items Shipped (Shipped by)
596	21-Jan-03	USAMRIID [redacted] [redacted] USAMRIID Radiati Frederick MD 2170 USA	3 vials containing Bacillus anthracis Sterne & B. thuringiensis	21-Jan-03 ✓	2 vials (One containing 1.25g of B. anthracis Sterne & one vial containing 1.5g of Bacillus thuringiensis) *
618	10-Mar-03	USAMRIID [redacted] Bruce Ivins USAMRIID Fort Detrick MD 2170 USA	Bacillus anthracis spores	11-Mar-03 ✓	1 vial containing 90 ml of B. anthracis Ames (Lot# 18 Feb 03)
626	29-Apr-03	USAMRIID [redacted] [redacted] USAMRIID Radiati Frederick MD 2170 USA	3 bottles of Y. pestis	29-Apr-03 ✓	3 bottles, each containing 175 mL of Yersinia pestis Kim on dry ice
629	30-Apr-03	USAMRIID [redacted] [redacted] USAMRIID Radiati Frederick MD 2170 USA	2 vials containing a total of 15 grams of Bacillus anthracis Sterne	30-Apr-03 ✓	2 vials containing a total of 15 grams of Bacillus anthracis Sterne on ice packs *

7 MAY 03 - see next p

U.S. ARMY DUGWAY PROVING GROUND
REQUEST FOR SHIPMENT OF
ETIOLOGIC AGENT/BIOLOGICAL PRODUCT

FOR: WD-L BIOLOGICAL SAFETY OFFICER

Please check block

b6
b7C

- (X) Non-Infectious Specimen, Non-Select Agent
() Biological toxin
() Etiological Agent

Sterilization Record:
Method: See attached
Log Book:
Date:

Description:

Yersinia pestis, KIM
10⁹/ml (1 May 03)

Quantity:
3 - 175 ml bottles

Bacillus anthracis Sterne
10¹⁰/gram (5 May 03) *

3 - tubes (29 grams total)

Bacillus subtilis var *niger*
10¹⁰/gram (5 May 03)

1 - tube (8 grams)

Erwinia herbicola
10¹⁰/gram

100 mL

Shipper's Name:

Phone:
FAX:

Emergency Phone:

Shipment Date: 8 April 03

Ship to Address:

Fort Detrick, 1425 Porter Street
Frederick, MD 21707-5011

Phone Number of Recipient:

Required Shipment Date: 8 April 03

Method of Shipment Requested: (check one)

() DPG Courier () UPS (X) Fed. Ex. () Other

Special Requirements: (check one)

(X) Dry Ice () Refrigerate () Other (Explain) () Amount in lbs

Signatures/Date:

Requesting Investigator:

Biological Safety Officer, WD-L

Chief, Life Sciences Division

Phone:
After Hours:

~~SECRET~~

(Rev. 08-28-2000)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 09/01/2004

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field

Attn: SA [REDACTED]

From: Washington Field

APPROVED BY: [REDACTED]

(S)

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

b1

CASE ID #: 279A-WF-222936 ✓ - 6419
66F-WF-228351-AMX

Title: AMERITHRAX;

(S)

b1

Synopsis: Completion of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b6
b7C
b7E

Reference: 66F-WF-228351-AMX SERIAL 13

Details: On 9/1/2004, writer completed manual entry of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S)

Please Cover Lead Assigned to [REDACTED]

b1

(S)

CC

♦♦

(S)

b1

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

279A-WF-222936 - 6677

b6
b7C

1

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] on 12/09/2004:

Sergeant [REDACTED], Maryland State Police, conducted name checks in the computer databases of the Maryland State Police, Frederick City Police Department and the Frederick County Sheriff's Office on [REDACTED] current and/or former USAMRIID employees. The report faxed by Sergeant [REDACTED] is attached to and made part of this Insert. The individuals searched by Sergeant [REDACTED] and a summary of the information obtained is as follows:

BRUCE IVINS

07/31/1999, Frederick City Police Department, Failure to Obey Traffic Device at Rosemont Avenue and Shookstown Road. \$70.00 fine.

10/08/2000, Frederick City Police Department, IVINS was the victim of a robbery. No additional information provided.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Negative results.

[REDACTED]

Negative results.

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

ADDITIONAL CHECKS

SA [Redacted] Division, [Redacted]
[Redacted] RA, completed a local name check for [Redacted] with
negative results.

SA [Redacted] Division [Redacted]
[Redacted] RA, completed a local name check for [Redacted] with
negative results. The negative results report provided by SA
[Redacted] is attached to and made part of this Insert.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

Date: 12-9-04

b6
b7c

FAX COVER SHEET

TO:

FROM:

Te

LOCATION:

LOCATION: M.S.P. BARRACK "B"110 AIRPORT DRIVE EASTFREDERICK, MD 21701

PHONE #:

FAX #: 301-631-3699

FAX #:

TELEPHONE: 301-644-4151SENDING COVER SHEET PLUS 21 PAGES.

COMMENTS:

DEC-09-2004 14:00

FD-448 (Rev. 6-2-97)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg



FBI FACSIMILE

COVER SHEET

b6
b7c

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☒ Routine

CLASSIFICATION

- ☐ Top Secret
☐ Secret
☐ Confidential
☐ Sensitive
☒ Unclassified

Time Transmitted: 1:50
Sender's Initials: npu
Number of Pages: 3
(including cover sheet)

To: Maryland State Police
Name of Office

Date: 12/09/2004Facsimile Number: (301) 631-3699

Attn: Sergeant (301) 644-4179
Name Room Telephone

From: Frederick Office
Name of Office

Subject: Name ChecksSpecial Handling Instructions: NoneOriginator's Name: Telephone: Originator's Facsimile Number: Approved:

Brief Description of Communication Faxed: Sergeant Please see attached
documentation. Thanks.

WARNING

Information attached to the cover sheet is U.S. Government Property. If you are not the intended recipient of this information, disclosure, reproduction, distribution, or use of this information is prohibited (18.U.S.C. § 641). Please notify the originator or the local FBI Office immediately to arrange for proper disposition.

12/09/2004 17:02 FAX 3016313699
DEC-09-2004 14:00

FREDERICKCOUNTYSHERIFFS

003
r.0c


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

Sergeant [REDACTED]

b6
b7c

Thank you in advance for helping me out. Several of the individuals no longer live in the area but I still wanted to run their names to see if they had any police contact during the period they lived here.

If you could please fax any results back to me at [REDACTED] that would be great. Please call me at [REDACTED] if you have any questions.



12/09/2004 17:02 FAX 3016313699
DEC-09-2004 14:00

FREDERICKCOUNTYSHERIFFS

004
F.23

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

b6
b7C

EC50

FCP0

MSP

Bruce Ivins
622 Military Road, Frederick, MD 21702
DOB: 4/22/46
SSN: 280-44-5449

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

Citations

* Retrieve Mode *

b6
b7c

*Agn: 02 *Cit No: 0W209250 Ref No: - - Date: 07131999 Time: 16:00

Weekday: TUESDAY Name: IVINS, BRUCE EDWARDS

Add: [REDACTED]

City: FREDERICK

State: MARYLAND

Zip: 21702

Res Jur:

Lic#: I152098188310

Lic State: MD

CDL: C

Dob: 04221946 Sex: MALE

Race: WHITE

Hair:

Eyes:

Height: 510 Weight: 150 Veh Lic #: 885437M State: MARYLAND

Yr: 1996

Make: DODG Model: Style: Color(s):

Comm Veh:

Prim Viol: FAIL OBEY TRAF DEV Type: TRAFFIC LVL: Viol 2:

Viol 3: Viol 4: Approx Speed: Posted: Safe:

Rd: 011F Beat: 005F Loc: ROSEMONT AVE & SHOOKSTOWN RD Court Date:

E/W Street: N/S Street:

Officer: [REDACTED] Inv in T/C: Dispo: Age: 53

Tag Exp: Fine Amt: 0070 Susp: Cost: CLERK:

Date Paid: Method: Receipt #: VR-119:

Remarks:

Agency Assigned:

Shift Code:

Purge Code:

7-31-1999

FAIL TO OBEY TRAFFIC
DEVICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

Incident Name
* Retrieve Mode *b6
b7c

*Agency: 02 *Incident No: 2000-00102062-001 Name: IVINS, BRUCE EDWARDS

Name Type: VICTI Victim type: Date: 10/08/2000 Addr:
City: FREDERICK State: MD Zip: 21702- Phone:
Resident Status: Offense: ROB-S-COM R.D of Occurrence: 049F
Bus Addr: Bus City: Bus Phn: - -DOB: 04/22/1946 Age range: 54- Race: W Sex: M Height: Weight:
Hair Color: Eye Color: Ethnic:
Rpt. Officer: Misc#: Weapon: Lic St: Lic No:
Remarks: Dr Lic No: Veh Year: Make: Model:
Type injury: Style: Color: Purge Code:
Victim/UCR code:
Aggr assault: Related #:
Just Homicide: Relationship:
AKA Names:

10-08-2000

VICTIM / ROBBERY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg



b6
b7c

**FBI FACSIMILE
COVER SHEET**

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ Immediate
☐ Priority
☐ Routine

CLASSIFICATION

- ☐ Top Secret
☐ Secret
☐ Confidential
☐ Sensitive
☒ Unclassified

Time Transmitted: 3:35
Sender's Initials: GRLG
Number of Pages: 2
(including cover sheet)

To: WFO
Name of Office

Date: 12/09/2004

Facsimile Number: _____

Attn:	
<div>Name</div>	<div>Room Telephone</div>

From: PROVIDENCE RA
Name of Office

Subject: BCL

Special Handling Instructions: _____

Originator's Name:	Telephone:
--------------------	------------

Originator's Facsimile Number:

Approved: _____

Brief Description of Communication Faxed:

WARNING

Information attached to the cover sheet is U.S. Government Property. If you are not the intended recipient of this information, disclosure, reproduction, distribution, or use of this information is prohibited (18.U.S.C. § 641). Please notify the originator or the local FBI Office immediately to arrange for proper disposition.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7CDate of transcription 03/30/2005

On July 19, 2004, Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) [redacted] wrote a document, sent by Telefax and First Class Mail, to [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland. In the letter, [redacted] requested that [redacted] avail to FBI agents all laboratory notebooks and files containing any reference to activities and research conducted on or involving the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba), including but not limited to, the laboratory notebooks assigned to, or used by, the following USAMRIID researchers:

[redacted]

Bruce Ivins

[redacted]

A copy of the document is hereby attached.

Investigation on 03/30/2005 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936 - 6877Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]



U.S. Department of Justice

[Redacted]
United States Attorney

District of Columbia

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

*Judiciary Center
555 Fourth St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530*

July 19, 2004

b6
b7C

BY TELEFAX & FIRST CLASS MAIL

[Redacted]
United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID)
521 Fraim Street
Fort Detrick, MD 21702

Re [Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]

b3
b6
b7C

As you know [Redacted]
investigate the anthrax letter attacks of September and October of 2001 which caused the death of five people in Florida, New York, Connecticut, and the District of Columbia, and seriously injured 17 others. We appreciate the assistance your office and the organization of USAMRIID has provided the investigation, especially during the past week.

While the inventory search continues over the next few days, it would be helpful if USAMRIID would promptly make the following laboratory documents available for FBI agents to review and copy as needed. The agents are interested in *all laboratory notebooks and files containing any reference to activities and research conducted on or involving the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis*, including but not limited to the laboratory notebooks assigned to, or used by, the following USAMRIID researchers:

[Redacted]	[Redacted]
------------	------------

b3
b6
b7C

Letter to [redacted]

- Page Two -

b6
b7C

Today's request for access to these [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b3

Supervisory Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] are presently at the
USAMRIID facility and will be available to begin this review process as soon as you can make
[redacted] available. [redacted] pager is [redacted] and [redacted] pager is
[redacted] Please call me if you have any questions concerning this request.

b6
b7C

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]
United States Attorney

By: [redacted]
[redacted]

Assistant U.S. Attorney
U.S. Attorney's Office
555 4th Street, NW, Room 11-850
Washington, DC 20530
(202) 616-2139 (direct)
(202) 616-4790 (fax)

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/10/2005

At approximately 10:55 a.m. on 04/10/2005, Special Agent [redacted] performed physical surveillance on [redacted] a single family residence owned by BRUCE IVINS.

b6
b7C

During the surveillance, the following vehicles were located on or near the abovementioned property:

[redacted] - [redacted] Tag [redacted] A [redacted] databases search revealed that this vehicle is registered to [redacted] (known to writer as [redacted])

Blue Honda Civic - Maryland Tag - KYG 680. MVA database search revealed that this vehicle is registered to BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, [redacted] Frederick, Maryland.

[redacted] - [redacted] Tag - [redacted] database search revealed that this vehicle is registered to [redacted]

[redacted] MVA information for the abovementioned vehicles is attached to and made part of this document.

During the surveillance it was noted that the homes [redacted] are located on a street named [redacted]. Surveillance from [redacted] revealed the [redacted]

Investigation on 04/10/2005 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936 - 6899

Date dictated _____

by [redacted]

Page: 1 Document Name: untitled

*** NLET RR RESP #30781 RCVD FOR DCFBIWFS6/T1KF/FB0431 FROM MDMSP0000 ***
NAME/BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS.HGT/510.WGT/150.RAC/2-WHITE.SEX/M.DOB/042246 b6
STREET [REDACTED] CTY/FREDERICK.CO/F.STATE/MD.ZIP/21702. b7C
TITLE-FLG /NONE .
SERIAL-FLG/NONE .
* END OF DATA * - FOR CLARIFICATION OF DATA TAGS SEE MD. NLETS HELP FILE.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

*** NCIC RESPONSE #30819

RCVD FOR DCFBIWF00/T1KF/FB0431 ***

DCFBIWF00
NO RECORD LIC/MBN182 LIS/MD

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/10/2005b6
b7c

On 04/07/2005, Special Agent (SA) [redacted] conducted physical surveillance on [redacted] a single family residence owned by BRUCE IVINS. During the surveillance, SA [redacted] covertly took pictures of the residence. The film is being sent to the Washington Field Photography Unit for processing.

Investigation on 04/07/2005 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-6898

Date dictated _____

by [redacted]

This [redacted] conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/10/2005b6
b7C

On the morning of 04/05/2005, Special Agent (SA)
conducted physical surveillance of [REDACTED] a single
family residence owned by BRUCE E. IVINS. The property is
described below:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(7)

[REDACTED]

Investigation on 04/05/2005 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-6897

Date dictated _____

by [REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936 - 6896

[REDACTED]

1

b6
b7C

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [REDACTED] between 04/06/2005 and 04/07/2005:

Writer contacted [REDACTED], NCIC specialist, CJIS regarding performing an off-line NCIC search on BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, date of birth 04/22/1946, Social Security Account Number 280-44-5449.

[REDACTED] search revealed 22 reports from various jurisdictions. A copy of the report is attached to and made part of this Insert.

[REDACTED]

12

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1N01XXTOM
DCFBIWAK2

[REDACTED] txt

TITLE: 2005000000

ROUTE TO: [REDACTED]

ADDRESS: CJIS

EXTENSION: [REDACTED]

COMMENTS: [REDACTED]

b6
b7c

TYPE: HYP

NEED: UNI

FILE:

BEGIN DATE: 20000101

END DATE: 20050406

LIST TYPE:

LST

FILE SIZE: 000000000

COUNT: 000000

RANDOM NUMBER

LIST:

IMAGE INDICATOR:

FIELDS SEARCHED: NAM/IVINS,B019460422.SOC/280445449
□ 77 2004-11-17-11.06.06.661988

1N01ED020MRID8X98G0.QP0.MDMSP6010.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE

EDWARDS.D0B/19460422.SOC/280445449

ORI IS STATE POLICE LICENSING DIV PIKESVILLE [REDACTED]

77 2003-11-14-09.26.40.288675

1N01EI020MRID8TOZGV.QW.MD01604V0.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE EDWARDS.D0B/19460422.SEX/M.RAC/W

ORI IS MONTGOMERY COUNTY PD ROCKVILLE [REDACTED]

13 2003-10-22-08.30.44.392858

1N014000028283396.QTP.WVIAF0000.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE

EDWARDS.D0B/11111111.19460422.SEX/M.RAC/U.0CA/280445449.SOC/280445449.ICN/IFCS000400

0028283396.TCN/0702828334.LRI/WVBI0000Z.ON1/CJIS

DIVISION-FBI.ON2/BIOTERRORISM.ON3/CJIS-BIOTERRORISM.0AC/CLARKSBURG.SIG/WV.ZIP/26306.

TOT/MISCELLANEOUS APPLICANT CSS SUBMISSION.DFP/20031008.RFP/BIOTERRORISM

ACT.IDE/20031022

ORI IS FBI PDS CRIMINAL INFORMATION AND TRANSITION [REDACTED]

2D 2003-10-20-10.24.51.675057

1N01CQUQE3C88800888.QW.VATRE0199.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.D0B/19460422

ORI IS U S TREASURY FINANCIAL CRIMES ENF NET ARLINGTON [REDACTED]

60 2003-10-08-09.18.02.674195

1N01FLS0382850380.QW.FLFBIMM01.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.D0B/19460422.SEX/M.RAC/U.SOC/28044544

9

ORI IS FBI MIAMI [REDACTED]

64 2003-08-26-05.38.32.034908

1N01DC0005991189.QW.DCFBIWF00.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE

.D0B/19460422.RAC/U.SEX/M

ORI IS FBI FIELD OFFICE WASHINGTON [REDACTED]

1E 2003-04-04-03.38.10.869427

1L01Q23EN3056417046.QW.VAUSC6099.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.D0B/19460422

ORI IS US CUST SERV ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS NEWINGTON [REDACTED]

[REDACTED].txt

b6
b7c

26 2003-03-28-17.40.48.553908

1L01S2DJN3052721270.QW.VAUSC6099.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.DOB/19460422

ORI IS US CUST SERV ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS NEWINGTON [REDACTED]

1E 2002-09-12-08.55.08.693925

1L01Q3R7N2086267568.QW.VAUSC6099.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.DOB/19460422

ORI IS US CUST SERV ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS NEWINGTON [REDACTED]

77 2002-08-10-01.18.30.913200

1L01ZNG302810001223.QW.MD0160205.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE EDWARDS.SEX/M.RAC/W.DOB/19460422

ORI IS GAITHERSBURG PD [REDACTED]

1E 2002-08-02-14.19.32.231076

1L01P3ACN2065060024.QW.VAUSC6099.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.DOB/19460422

ORI IS US CUST SERV ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS NEWINGTON [REDACTED]

1E 2002-08-02-14.16.43.261715

1L01P6XNN0802000098.QW.VAUSC6099.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.DOB/19460422

ORI IS US CUST SERV ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS NEWINGTON [REDACTED]

8A 2002-05-30-00.51.18.544805

1L01UFB5 DQ .QW.IDFBIP000.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE E.DOB/19460422.SEX/M.RAC/U

ORI IS POCATELLO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CENTER [REDACTED]

8A 2002-05-30-00.51.11.169572

1L01UFB5 DQ .QW.IDFBIP000.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE E.DOB/19460422.SEX/M.RAC/U

ORI IS POCATELLO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CENTER [REDACTED]

8A 2002-05-30-00.47.13.236329

1L01UFB5 QW .QW.IDFBIP000.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.DOB/19460422.RAC/U.SEX/M.SOC/280445449

ORI IS POCATELLO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CENTER [REDACTED]

2D 2002-02-13-09.54.47.449253

1L01CQUQVZA10300103.QW.DCFBITGT5.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE E.DOB/19460422

ORI IS FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION [REDACTED]

2D 2002-02-09-09.34.21.780362

1L01CQUQVZA08000080.QW.DCFBITGT6.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE E.DOB/19460422

ORI IS FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION [REDACTED]

2D 2002-02-09-09.33.05.400478

1L01CQUQVZA07800078.QW.DCFBITGT6.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.DOB/19460422

ORI IS FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION [REDACTED]

2D 2002-02-09-09.32.55.133818

1L01CQUQVZA07700077.QW.DCFBITGT6.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.DOB/19460422

ORI IS FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION [REDACTED]

2D 2002-02-09-09.32.46.119291

1L01CQUQVZA07600076.QW.DCFBITGT6.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.DOB/19460422

ORI IS FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION [REDACTED]

2D 2002-02-09-09.32.10.129748

1L01CQUQVZA07500075.QW.DCFBITGT6.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.DOB/19460422

ORI IS FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION [REDACTED]

2D 2002-02-09-09.31.56.324730

1L01CQUQVZA07400074.QW.DCFBITGT6.NAM/IVINS, BRUCE.DOB/19460422

ORI IS FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION [REDACTED]

THE DATA PROVIDED IS FROM THE BDAT THROUGH THE FOLLOWING DATE: 04-06-2005

END OF REPORT

TOTAL RECORDS REPORTED:

22



txt

REPORT DATE: 04-07-2005

TOTAL RECORDS PROCESSED:

b6
b7C

23

279A-WF-222936 -6895

[REDACTED]

b6
b7c

1

The following investigation was performed by Special Agent [REDACTED] on 04/10/2005:

Previous investigation had revealed that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Maryland Vehicle Administration (MVA) records indicate that the abovementioned vehicle is indeed registered to BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, [REDACTED] and bears [REDACTED] tag [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The abovementioned MVA documentation is attached to and made part of this document.

(9)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936-7039

b6
b7c

1

The following investigation was conducted by Postal
Inspector [REDACTED] United States Postal Inspection
Service, on June 14, 2005.

Customer contact information was obtained from the
United States Postal Inspection Service [USPIS case number [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] for the following addresses and associated
persons during the indicated periods:

<u>ADDRESS</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PERIOD</u>
[REDACTED]	<u>BRUCE IVINS</u>	10/25/2004-continuing
	[REDACTED]	10/25/2004-05/18/2005
		01/03/2005-04/13/2005
		01/03/2005-04/13/2005
		01/13/2005-05/13/2005
		01/13/2005-03/12/2005

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936 - 7062

[REDACTED]

1

b6
b7c

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [REDACTED] on 06/27/2005:

Writer contacted [REDACTED] Security Department, Level 3 Communications (L3C), Broomfield, Colorado, telephone number [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised that L3C could not provide Internet Protocol (IP) address information for 2001. They maintain IP address information for 18 months.

Administrative: BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS uses America Online (AOL) as his internet service provider (ISP). The three numbers IVINS dialed to connect with AOL were [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. AOL leased [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] from Genuity Corporation. Subsequent to 2001, Genuity was purchased by L3C. Writer contacted L3C to determine if a range of IP addresses used by the two numbers leased from Genuity could be obtained. If an address could have been obtained, it was to be compared to a list of IP addresses that accessed the AMERITHAX victims websites. This list is maintained by the New York Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

[REDACTED]

(X)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936 - 7009

b6
b7C


1

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [REDACTED] on June 29, 2005:

During a review of electronic evidence in support of Major Case 184, an email from BRUCE IVINS to [REDACTED] written July 4, 2000 was found. In the email, IVINS discusses his mental history, stating that his psychiatrist and counselor believe that he has Paranoid Personality Disorder, which is often seen in blood relatives of schizophrenics. In the email, IVINS asks [REDACTED] to "check out" <http://www.ccspublishing.com/journals2/paranoid.htm>.

A review of the abovementioned website revealed that the website is administered by the Library of The National Medical Society. The abovementioned website includes links to medical journals including the Journal of Psychiatry.

A printout of the abovementioned website is attached to and made part of this document. A copy of the referenced email is also attached to and made part of this document.



[The page you requested has moved. Click here to view.](#)

[Online Medical Library -- The National Medical Society](#)

Online Books and Journals:

- [Online Diagnosis](#)
- [Journal of Family Medicine](#)
- [Journal of Primary Care Medicine](#)
- [Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology](#)
- [Journal of Medicine](#)
- [Journal of Pediatric Medicine](#)
- [Journal of Psychiatry](#)
- [Journal of Surgery](#)
- [Journal of Emergency Medicine and Acute Primary Care](#)
- [Journal of AIDS/HIV](#)
- [Medical Library](#)
- [Women's Health Library](#)
- [Children's Health Library](#)
- [Emotional and Mental Health Library](#)
- [Surgery Information Center](#)
- [Emergency Medical Care Topics](#)
- [AIDS and HIV Information Center](#)
- [CCS Books](#)



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

In Reply, Please Refer to

File No. 279A-WF-222936 -7319

7799 Leesburg Pike
Falls Church, Virginia 22043
February 9, 2006



b3
b6
b7C

Dear 

The AMERITHRAX Task Force of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is investigating the mailing of letters containing anthrax which were sent to the New York Post, Tom Brokaw and United States Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy in the fall of 2001.

Pursuant to this investigation the FBI has established a repository (FBIR) which contains isolates of the Ames strain of *Ba* from the United States and other countries around the world at the United States Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland.

Following the mailings, the FBI identified any government, commercial, and university laboratories that had virulent Ames strain *Bacillus anthracis* in their inventories prior to the attacks.




b3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg



In Reply, Please Refer to

File No.

On February 1, 2006, SA

FBI,

Washington Field Office, met with

and

and identified the following

b3
b6
b7C

U.S. Department of Justice

b6
b7C



Federal Bureau of Investigation

Please refer all questions to Special Agent [redacted]
[redacted] FBI, [redacted] (C) who is the
In Reply, Please Refer to [redacted]
Point of Contact for this project. Thank you for your
Assistance.

Sincerely,

[redacted]
Inspector In Charge

by, [redacted]

[redacted]
Supervisory Special Agent

b3
b7F

Purpose:

Materials:

Procedure:

Documentation and Shipping:

Prior to shipping, contact SA [] at desk [] or cell []
[] and [] of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
(USAMRIID) Special Pathogens Sample Test Laboratory, at [] to initiate the Centers
for Disease Control Select Agent Transfer (Form 2) documentation. Consult your own organization's
safety office regarding packaging, labeling, and documenting the shipment. Ship [] to
USAMRIID [] via appropriate priority overnight delivery in accordance with your
organizations safety guidelines.

Shipping Address:

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
MCMR-UID-P; Special Pathogens
Attn: []
Special Pathogens Branch
1425 Porter Street
Fort Detrick, MD 21702-5011

TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION REPORT

b6
b7C

TIME : 02/16/2006 14:33
NAME : AMERTTHERAX
FAX :
TEL :

DATE, TIME
FAX NO./NAME
DURATION
PAGE(S)
RESULT
MODE

02/16 14:31

00:01:25
06
OK
STANDARD
ECM


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg


279A-WF-222936 - 7133




b6
b7C



1

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent 

On 04/27/2005, writer was requested by Inspector In-Charge (IIC)  to query the Internet Protocol (IP) Database established by the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for any "hits" from BRUCE E. IVINS' home computer IP address.

Based on information gathered on 06/27/2005 and between 07/06 and 07/11/2005, IP information for IVINS' home computer was not available.

A copy of the request made by  is attached to and made part of this document.



----- Working Copy -----

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

Page 1

4/27/05

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 04/02/2002

To: Washington Field

Attn: Amerithrax Task Force,

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SA [redacted]

SS [redacted]

b6
b7C

From: New York

Squad C-37

Contact: IOS [redacted]

Approved By: [redacted]

Drafted By: [redacted]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936-NYI (Pending)

Title: AMERITHRAX;

MAJOR CASE 184;

WMD MATTERS;

OO: WF

Synopsis: Summary of the contact page Internet log cross correlation project. Administrative coverage of lead assignment.

Reference: 279A-WF-222936-NYI Serial 17

Details: Reference is made to referenced communication stating initial lead assignment and New York EC to Counterterrorism Division, authored by SA [redacted] dated 02/15/2002.

By way of background, New York Division set out to determine if a single computer user (UNSUB) accessed Internet sites belonging to Anthrax victims in order to obtain mailing address information.

*Pls cut a lead to NY
referencing this EC and
ask them to run
Ivins' home IP
address against their
database.*

Thanks

Case ID : 279A-WF-222936-NYI

Serial : 45

To execute captioned lead assignment, New York Division obtained the Internet logs for the US Senate as well as other victims, including NBC News, CBS News and American Media (parent of National Enquirer Magazine) amongst others. These logs contain the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of Internet users that have viewed the webpages which contain the postal mailing address information for the respective victim entities.

These IP addresses were captured and stored within an intelligence database to search for possible correlations. Writer created and currently maintains this database, which consists of 234,237 distinct IP addresses and over 10.4 million Internet log records.

With respect to the Internet pages for Senators Daschle and Leahy, it was discovered by the New York Division that other Internet sites, specifically Congress.Org and Visi.Com, maintain Internet pages for Members of Congress, including Senators Daschle and Leahy. These pages include biographical information as well as address/contact information. The address information listed is identical to the address text written upon the envelopes that contained the Anthrax spores. As a result, the Internet logs for both organizations were obtained and entered within this database as well.

Numerous searches were performed upon this captured data to determine any correlations. It should be noted during the course of this analysis that Internet Service Providers such as America Online and the At Home networks use an extensive network of Proxy and Web caching services for which it was not possible to obtain logs.

With exhaustive analysis, New York Division was not able to find any potential subjects. However, this database and the search tools associated with it have been extensively developed. This database stands ready to assist Washington Field and other FBI field divisions with possible subjects who have known IP address information.

Lead assignments with known IP address information may be forwarded to the New York Division for verification as to whether or not a person of interest has visited Internet pages

which contained mailing information of victim entities.

Any questions or comments regarding the above can be directed to SA or the Writer at the New York Division.

b6
b7c

With respect to the above, the above-mentioned lead assignment should be deemed covered.

LEADS):

Set Lead 1:

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT AMERITHRAX TASK FORCE

Read and Clear.

279A-WF-222936 - 7130

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

1

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [REDACTED] on 08/22/2005:

An internet search was performed at www.google.com for "SAEDA". Numerous results were returned. Based on the search results, SAEDA is an acronym for Army Regulation 381-12, "Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the United States Army." The search revealed a link to a copy of Regulation 381-12. A copy of the Regulation is attached to and made part of this document.

A review of Regulation 381-12 revealed that all "Department of Army (DA) personnel will receive SAEDA training at least annually" (per Chapter 2, Paragraph 1 of 381-12). 381-12 also details what is considered an SAEDA incident (Chapter 3, Paragraph 1) and how they should be reported (Chapter 3, Paragraph 4). 381-12 includes additional information regarding subversion and espionage activities.

[Administrative: On 9/13/2000, BRUCE E. IVINS sent an email to [REDACTED] that included the following sentence: "Today we have to go to a SAEDA briefing to see what the spies want from us." This reference by IVINS appears to be the annual training that is mandated by Regulation 381-12.]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

279A-WF-222936 - 7129

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

1

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [REDACTED] on 08/22/2005:

Writer accessed the website www.anthraxvaccine.org and reviewed the content of the site. The site is maintained by Dr. MERYL NASS, M.D. The site contains "Information on anthrax, anthrax vaccine, biological warfare and related topics." The site appears to not support the fact that the anthrax vaccine is administered to the United States Armed Forces soldiers. The site contains links to many different sites discussing the anthrax vaccine and other related sites.

A copy of the home page of www.anthraxvaccine.org is attached to and made part of this document.

[Administrative: On 09/07/2000, BRUCE IVINS sent an email to [REDACTED] that read: "Here is a very interesting website. <http://www.anthraxvaccine.org>." That same day, IVINS forwarded the same message to [REDACTED].]

[REDACTED]

(1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-15-2008 BY 60324 uc baw/rs/lsg

THE ALL NEW
WWW.ANTHRAXVACCINE.ORG



Dr. Meryl Nass, M.D.

Home
New Vaccine Problems
VACCINE PROGRAM STOPPED
NEW ITEMS
Useful Links
US soldiers unprepared for CBW
Congressional Testimonies
Position Papers
RedFlagsWeekly
Dr. Meryl Nass's Curriculum Vitae, with links to articles and testimonies
Media Reports
FDA Reports
Military Vaccine Education Center
Smallpox Vaccine
Dover Air Force Base Survey
Gulf War Syndrome
Legal Issues
Congressional Letters
Posts to the Anthrax-no mailing list
Evidence That Vaccines Cause Illness
Treatment Suggestions
Response To Anthrax Attack, 2001
Contact Us

Anthrax Vaccine Submission to FDA

- o [Cover Letter to Acting FDA Commissioner](#)
- o [Comments and Questions regarding FDA's proposed rule and order to license Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed](#)

Information on anthrax, anthrax vaccine, biological warfare and related topics

This website was designed as a source of accurate information on the human anthrax vaccine, originally named MDPH-PA or AVA and renamed BioThrax in January 2002, which has been given to 550,000 servicemembers and some civilians. Information on anthrax and bioterrorism was added later.



I am a practicing physician. This page includes some of my writings on these subjects, including three Congressional testimonies, and a variety of other materials that I hope will be useful for those persons making a decision about taking the vaccine, dealing with bioterrorism, or those doing scholarly research on either subject.

Meryl Nass, MD
Diplomate, American Board of Internal Medicine

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7c

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 10/17/2005

To: Washington Field
Inspection

Attn: [REDACTED]

From: Washington Field
AMX-3

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: (U) 279A-WF-222936 ✓ (Pending) - 7182

Title: (U) AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: (U) Interim summary relating to early case file review of documents referencing the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and/or its employees.

(U)

~~(S)~~

~~Derived From : G-3~~

~~Declassify On: X1~~

Details: (U) In order to ensure investigation has not overlooked any individuals who may have had access to the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) at USAMRIID, a review was conducted of the first thirty-three SUB 302 volumes.

(U) The afore-mentioned review identified numerous individuals who were not found on the list of individuals known to have had access to the Ames strain of Ba. ACS case file checks were completed on the identified individuals in an attempt to determine their role at USAMRIID as well as access to Ba Ames. Additionally, USAMRIID historical vaccination records were checked to determine if the individual was vaccinated against anthrax. Checks were conducted on the following individuals:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

[REDACTED]

(U) ACS was searched in regards to the above-mentioned individuals with the following results:

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1470) of [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] was a researcher in the [REDACTED] and had studied ways to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [REDACTED] with negative results.

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1458) of [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1460) of [REDACTED]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] while in the [REDACTED] Division, conducted a study with [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 723) of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

(U) NOTE: It is possible that [REDACTED] may have meant
[REDACTED] not [REDACTED]

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [REDACTED] with negative results.

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 635) of
[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] did not have access to
anthrax suites.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - POI, Serial 1122) of
[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] at USAMRIID and
worked with [REDACTED]

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [REDACTED] with negative results.

(U) FNU [REDACTED]

(U) EC (279A-WF-222936 - MAIN, Serial 2346) re: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] date of birth [REDACTED]
Social Security Number [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1817) of
[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - POI, Serial 1377) of
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

b6
b7C

(U) [] advised [] worked for the []
[] Division and was []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 628) of
[]

(U) [] felt the FBI should take a closer look at an
individual named [] described [] as disgruntled
and claimed [] said []

(U) EC (279A-WF-222936 - MAIN, Serial 1115) of
Interviews at USAMRIID.

[] was a [] and USAMRIID does not have a
record of [] employment in []

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [] with positive results. [] date of
birth [] social security number [] was first
vaccinated on [] and received a final booster on []

(U) []

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1470) of
[]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [] advised [] was a researcher in the
[] and had studied ways to []
[] Currently, [] works in [] or the
[] Division.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [] with negative results.

(U) []:

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 870) of
[]

(U) [] has worked with [] and is
supervised by []

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [] with negative results.

(U) []

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

(U) Note: Documents were found with the name [redacted]
[redacted] References to both names are found below.

b6
b7C

(U) EC (279A-WF-222936 - [redacted] Serial 28) re: [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) [redacted] report on [redacted] date
of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 -USAMRIID, Serial 1195)
of Bruce Ivins.

(U) Ivins described his current office and other who
might have used it. Ivins stated agents should talk to [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1948) of
[redacted]

(U) [redacted] mentioned an individual named [redacted]
[redacted] who did not work on Ba or have a lot of hot suite access
but had quite a temper.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 634) of
[redacted]

(U) [redacted] advised [redacted] worked primarily
with [redacted] but may have had access to anthrax.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted] [sic]:

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - MAIN, Serial 4003) of
[redacted]

(U) [redacted] date of birth
[redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] has a [redacted] in
[redacted] from [redacted] College and a
[redacted] from [redacted] University. [redacted] reported to
USAMRIID in [redacted] and was assigned to the [redacted]
Division. [redacted] has only worked with [redacted] and not
the agent itself.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1460) of [redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] worked with [redacted] in the [redacted] Division on a study involving [redacted]

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with positive results. [redacted] received [redacted] primary anthrax vaccination on [redacted] and [redacted] final booster on [redacted]. Records make no mention of an individual named [redacted].

(U) [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 631) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] stated [redacted] may have experience working with refined materials.

b6
b7C
b7E

(U) EC (279A-WF-222936 [redacted] Serial 934) re: [redacted]

(U) The name [redacted] is listed as an author on a document titled [redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with negative results. However, records indicate that an individual named [redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] from [redacted] received an anthrax booster on [redacted] received [redacted] final booster on [redacted].

(U) [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1457) of [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] advised [redacted] left USAMRIID out of frustration, but [redacted] does not believe [redacted] would have the knowledge or motivation to be involved with the anthrax mailings.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with positive results. [redacted] [redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted] of the [redacted] Division received a primary anthrax vaccination on [redacted] and [redacted] final vaccination on [redacted]

b6
b7C

(U) [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - POI, Serial 1122) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] was a [redacted] at USAMRIID. [redacted] supervisor was [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 635) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] advised [redacted] did not have access to the anthrax suites.

b6
b7C
b7E

(U) EC (279A-WF-222936 - [redacted] Serial 486) re: [redacted]

(U) [redacted] was given [redacted] credit for attending a lecture presented by [redacted] entitled [redacted] and Issues at USAMRIID."

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with negative results.

b6
b7C

(U) [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 631) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] provided [redacted] from the 4th International Conference on Anthrax. [redacted] from USAMRIID's Headquarters Office, was on the list.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 421) of [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

b6
b7C

(U) [] was a [] assigned to the [] Division. [] described [] as lax and careless handling dangerous items. [] worked [] at USAMRIID for approximately [] was from a [] and worked with [] worked with [] did not think [] would remove a biological agent from a hot suite with criminal intent.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [] with positive results. [] date of birth [] Social Security Number [] from [] received his primary anthrax vaccination on [] and [] final booster on []

(U) []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1223) of []

(U) [] is a [] USAMRIID researcher who worked for [] at []

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [] with negative results.

(U) []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - MAIN, Serial 4023) of []

(U) [] date of birth [] Social Security Number [] has a [] in [] and is a [] at USAMRIID. [] was vaccinated against anthrax in []

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [] with positive results. [] from [] received [] primary anthrax vaccination on [] and [] final booster on []

(U) []

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

b6
b7C

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 635) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] advised [redacted] did not have access to the anthrax suites.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1470) of [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] advised [redacted] [sic] was a researcher in the [redacted] and had studied [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 330) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] advised [redacted] formerly at [redacted] [redacted] has extensive knowledge about weaponizing anthrax.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 1282) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] was the [redacted] Division, and [redacted] was [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 1030) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] was responsible for [redacted] [redacted] was [redacted] supervisor.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 994) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] performed [redacted] during the [redacted] at USAMRIID.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 4176) of [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

(U) [] returned to USAMRIID in [] when
[]

b6
b7C

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1821) of
[]

(U) [] has [] experience, and []
regards [] as a good citizen.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [] with negative results.

(U) []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1066) of
[]

(U) [] is [] of the []
[] Division at USAMRIID.
[] was [] supervisor.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 635) of
[]

(U) [] advised [] did not have
access to the anthrax suites.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [] with negative results.

(U) []

b6
b7C
b7E

(U) EC (279A-WF-222936 - [] Serial 35) of []
[]

(U) [] date of birth [] Social Security
Number [] worked in the [] Division.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Insert (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 1328)
re: Foreign Visiting Scientists.

b6
b7C

(U) ~~(S)~~ [] was []
[] A query of vaccination record for [] was
negative.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

b6
b7c

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 620) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] was not considered trustworthy, and may have stolen from other researchers. [redacted] worked with [redacted] in [redacted] is not aware of any motivation for [redacted] to be involved in the anthrax attacks.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 723) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] was [redacted] at USAMRIID who worked with [redacted]

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 396) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] was [redacted] employee in the [redacted] Division. [redacted]

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~ Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1470) of [redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~ [redacted] advised [redacted] was a researcher in the [redacted] and had studied ways to [redacted] [redacted] was a [redacted] in Building [redacted]

(U)

~~(S)~~ Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1465) of [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

(U) ~~(S)~~ [] believes [] is the most knowledgeable about the anthrax program at USAMRIID. [] arrived at USAMRIID. [] may know individuals who would possess the knowledge about how to produce weapons-grade anthrax.

b6
b7C

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [] with negative results. It should be noted that a [] date of birth [] Social Security Number [], received a primary anthrax vaccination on [] and a final booster on []

(U) []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1223) of []

(U) [] was one of several individuals [] thought might have been involved in the anthrax attacks. [] is a former researcher []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 433) of []

(U) [] advised [] if [] is implicated as a subject of the anthrax case.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [] with negative results.

(U) []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 835) of []

(U) [] date of birth [] Social Security Number [], is currently employed at []

[] Additionally, [] worked at USAMRIID. While at USAMRIID, [] worked with [], but never in []

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

b6
b7C

environment. [] advised the majority of [] work
focused on []

(U)

(S) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1447) of
[]

(U)

(S) [] was the [] and
left USAMRIID to work at [] believes []
worked on [] anthrax at []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 379)
of []

(U) [] used to work in the []
Division at USAMRIID.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 2637) of
[]

(U) []
[] started working at USAMRIID in [] and []
[] primarily worked with [] including []
[]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 741) of
[]

(U) [] date of birth [] was hired by
[] in [] as a [] for the []
[] Division.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [] with positive results. []
[] date of birth [] received a
booster on []

(U) []

(U) EC (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 1131) re:
Laboratory Notebook Review Project.

(U) A folder entitled [] referenced the
name [] and a vaccine challenge that tested two types of
anthrax vaccines.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7c

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 644) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted], has a [redacted] in [redacted] a [redacted] in [redacted] and a [redacted] in [redacted] worked in the [redacted] Division and conducted research on [redacted] [redacted] never worked with Ba.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 328) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] advised the FBI should speak with several individuals including [redacted] in reference to the anthrax attacks. [redacted] was knowledgeable in the area of [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) It should be noted two references were found to an individual named [redacted] who was assigned to the [redacted] Department at USAMRIID from [redacted] In light of the names provided by [redacted], and the belief that [redacted] was a [redacted] it is not believed the two individuals are identical.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 991) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] is a [redacted]
[redacted] (It should be noted that the above-mentioned 302 was written in 2002.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

b6
b7c

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with positive results. [redacted] from [redacted] received the primary anthrax vaccine shot on [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 631) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] provided the [redacted] list from the [redacted] from [redacted] USAMRIID [redacted] was on the list.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1470) of [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] advised that [redacted] was a researcher in the [redacted] and had studied [redacted] [redacted] currently works in [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 57) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] advised [redacted] was [redacted] of the [redacted] and [redacted] could provide copies of [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - [redacted] Serial 813) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] is the [redacted] of the [redacted]

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with positive results. [redacted] date of birth [redacted] received booster vaccinations on [redacted] and [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

b6
b7C

(U) ~~(S)~~ Interview (279A-WF-222936 - IAP1, Serial 6) of
[redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] from the [redacted]
was involved in the [redacted] project. Discussed as part of this
project, in reference to the use of the [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 328) of
[redacted]

(U) [redacted] advised [redacted] worked for [redacted]
and has expertise in the area of [redacted]
[redacted] believes [redacted] worked with Ba.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ EC (279A-WF-222936 - IAP-1, Serial 37) re:
Interview of [redacted]

(U) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] advised [redacted] would talk to [redacted] during
breaks. Additionally, [redacted] was not in the
[redacted] program due [redacted], and therefore was [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 1901) of
[redacted]

(U) [redacted] is a [redacted] and [redacted]
[redacted] is a "radical" person and is disgruntled. [redacted] does
not know if [redacted] has access to the restricted laboratories.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 370) of
[redacted]

(U) [redacted] is a [redacted] at USAMRIID and [redacted]
[redacted] stated [redacted] has been

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

b6
b7c

[redacted] and has a license for [redacted]
[redacted] does not know if [redacted] has access to biological materials.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 380)
of [redacted]

(U) [redacted] told [redacted] that [redacted] was [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) FD-302 (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 234) re:
evidence storage.

(U) [redacted] from [redacted] was
involved in a meeting to determine [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 328) of
[redacted]

(U) [redacted] advised that [redacted] worked for [redacted]
[redacted] and has expertise in the area of [redacted]
[redacted] believes that [redacted] worked with Ba.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U) Insert (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 1076)
re: Foreign Visiting Scientists.

(U) [redacted] is assigned to the [redacted]
[redacted] Division.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 67)
of [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

b6
b7C

(U) [] is the [] for a []
located in room []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 3335) of
[]

(U) [] is assigned to []
[] located in room [], in building []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 701) of
[]

(U) [] was [] but they did
not get along. [] worked with []

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [] with positive results. [] date of
birth [] Social Security Number [] from the
[] Division received [] primary vaccination on []
and [] final booster on []

(U) []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 634) of
[]

(U) [] advised [] left USAMRIID
and may be at []

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [] with positive results. []
date of birth [] Social Security Number [] from
[] received [] primary vaccination on [] and []
final booster on []

(U) []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 1086)
of []

(U) [] date of birth [] works in the
[] Division at USAMRIID.

(U) EC (279A-WF-222936 - MAIN, Serial 1115) re:
USAMRIID interviews.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

b6
b7C

(U) Above-mentioned EC states [] did not have access to the hot suites.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 635) of []

(U) [] advised [] did not have access to the anthrax suites.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [] with negative results.

(U) []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 704) of []

(U) [] Social Security Number [] was a [] from [] has a [] and [] in [] worked for [] in the [] Division. [] does not work with anthrax and does not have access to the areas where anthrax is used. [] described [] as an excellent employee.

(U) Insert (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 717) re: checks on [] and []

(U) [] date of birth [] is a [] [] date of birth []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 705) of []

(U) [] is assigned to the [] Division and does not have access to any of the [] suites.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 713) of []

(U) A personnel file regarding [] work at [] [] contained two memos addressing [] poor job performance.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [] with negative results.

b6
b7C

(U) []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 704) of [] re: []

(U) [] is assigned to the [] Division at USAMRIID and was interviewed about []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 1082) of []

(U) [] date of birth [] Social Security Number [] was the []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 3394) of []

(U) [] is responsible for [] located in room [] on the [] floor of building [] uses the [] has never used or come in contact with Ba.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 1103) of []

(U) [] recalls using [] worked on the project with [] and advised the resulting material was given to []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 1264) of []

(U) In [] was assigned to the [] Division [] worked for [] used [] for []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 635) of []

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

(U) [] advised [] did not have access to the anthrax suites.

b6
b7C

(U) It should be noted there are numerous references to an individual named [] who may have had access to []. (A follow-up project has already begun on []

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [] with negative results.

(U) []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 634) of []

(U) [] advised [] was no longer at USAMRIID. [] was not sure where [] had gone, but to [] knowledge, [] did not work with anthrax.

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [] with positive results. [] date of birth [], Social Security Number [] from [] received a primary anthrax vaccination on [] and [] final booster on []

(U) []

(U) EC (279A-WF-222936 - [] Serial 788) re: []

b6
b7C
b7E

(U) [] date of birth [] Social Security Number [] is on the employee list for [] from [] until []

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 808) of []

b6
b7C

(U) [] might have expertise in weaponizing Ba. [] came from [] and is a [] researcher.

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 991) of []

(U) [] is a [] with [] and has been at USAMRIID since []

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

b6
b7c

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with negative results.

(U) [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 701) of [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

[redacted] Subsequently, [redacted] left USAMRIID for [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - 302, Serial 707) of [redacted]

(U) When [redacted]

arrived at USAMRIID [redacted] [redacted] was assigned to the [redacted] Division and worked with [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 1282)

of [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

transferred to the [redacted] Division in [redacted] was supervised by [redacted]

(U) Interview (279A-WF-222936 - USAMRIID, Serial 538)

of [redacted]

(U) After leaving USAMRIID in [redacted] continued

to [redacted]

Most of the projects involved [redacted]

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked on the name [redacted] with positive results. [redacted]

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] Social Security Number [redacted]

[redacted] received [redacted] primary anthrax vaccination on [redacted] and [redacted] final booster on [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) EC (279A-WF-222936 - MAIN, Serial 1115) Re: USAMRIID Interviews.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

To: Washington Field From: Washington Field
Re: (U) 279A-WF-222936, 10/17/2005

(U) [] was identified as someone no longer at
USAMRIID.

b6
b7c

(U) USAMRIID anthrax vaccination records were checked
on the name [] with negative results.

This information is being documented so that
appropriate follow-up interviews can be conducted.

♦♦

~~SECRET~~

(Rev. 01-31-2003)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7c

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 11/28/2005

To: Washington Field

Attn: A/SSA [REDACTED]
SA [REDACTED]

From: Washington Field
AMX-3

Contact: [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936✓ (Pending)-7224

Title: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: To provide results of AMX-3 investigative lead to review the book Microbe Hunters, by Paul de Kruif.

Details: During the course of captioned investigation, Bruce Edwards Ivins of the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) was evaluated due to his anthrax expertise. Ivins read the book, Microbe Hunters, by Paul de Kruif, and has stated that this book ultimately led to his decision to become a scientist. Microbe Hunters is a dramatization of the scientists, bacteriologists, doctors, and medical technicians who discovered various microbes and then invented the vaccines to counter them. Among others, de Kruif wrote about Robert Koch, who made important strides in understanding anthrax. Koch showed that anthrax is composed of bacilli bacteria that turn into spores under certain conditions. Koch also advised that animals who die of anthrax should either be burned or buried deep in the ground to prevent sporulation.

♦♦



279A-WF-222936 - 7233

1

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent
[redacted] on 11/20/2005:

b6
b7C

The United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), through USPIS case number [redacted], provided information on contacts made by BRUCE IVINS and [redacted] UNI checks were performed on both the names and addresses of the contact information. The results of these searches are detailed below:

The address [redacted]

[redacted] returned positive results in [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] was associated with the abovementioned address as well as the above captioned case (279A-WF-222936, Major Case 184). [redacted] was associated with this address as well as in case 245F-OM-40647. An ACS search was positive for [redacted], listed at the above mentioned address. [redacted] was interviewed in association with case 209A-BA-89666. [redacted] was investigated for [redacted]. [redacted] was not a subject in the investigation.

b6
b7C

b6
b7C
b7E

The address [redacted] returned a positive result in [redacted]. The number was associated to case 245D-BA-70832. A search performed on the current resident of this address, [redacted] returned negative results.

112

The following checks resulted in negative results:

NAME

ADDRESS

--

Name search not conducted [redacted]

--

--

--

279A-WF-222936 - 723A

[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

1

The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent
[REDACTED] on 5/4/2005:

BRUCE E. IVINS completed his post-doctoral work at the
University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill. While at UNC, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] taught him the concept of using
Renocal or Renografin as a density gradient.

b6
b7C
b7E

[REDACTED] was run on [REDACTED] to
determine here place of residence. The report returned the
following pertinent information:

Name:
DOB:
SSN:
Address:

[REDACTED]

Telephone [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

A copy of the abovementioned report is attached to and made
part of this document.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 58

Page 58 ~ b6, b7C

Page 59 ~ b6, b7C

Page 60 ~ b6, b7C

Page 61 ~ b6, b7C

Page 62 ~ b6, b7C

Page 63 ~ b6, b7C

Page 64 ~ b6, b7C

Page 65 ~ b6, b7C

Page 66 ~ b6, b7C

Page 67 ~ b6, b7C

Page 68 ~ b6, b7C

Page 69 ~ b6, b7C

Page 70 ~ b6, b7C

Page 71 ~ b6, b7C

Page 72 ~ b6, b7C

Page 73 ~ b6, b7C

Page 75 ~ b6, b7C

Page 82 ~ b6, b7C

Page 83 ~ b6, b7C

Page 84 ~ b6, b7C

Page 85 ~ b6, b7C

Page 86 ~ b6, b7C

Page 89 ~ b6, b7C

Page 90 ~ b6, b7C

Page 102 ~ Duplicate

Page 103 ~ Duplicate

Page 111 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 112 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 113 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 114 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 115 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 129 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 130 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 131 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 132 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 133 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 134 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 135 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 136 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 137 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 138 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 139 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 140 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 141 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 172 ~ b6, b7C
Page 177 ~ b6, b7C, b7E
Page 178 ~ b6, b7C, b7E
Page 179 ~ b6, b7C, b7E
Page 180 ~ b6, b7C, b7E
Page 181 ~ b6, b7C, b7E
Page 182 ~ b6, b7C, b7E
Page 183 ~ b6, b7C, b7E
Page 184 ~ b6, b7C, b7E
Page 185 ~ b6, b7C, b7E
Page 186 ~ b6, b7C, b7E
Page 187 ~ b6, b7C, b7E
Page 188 ~ b6, b7C, b7E
Page 189 ~ b6, b7C, b7E